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ABSTRACT 
 In this Article, the Author examines the rights of parents to litigate pro se 
on behalf of their children under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA). The Author reviews Alaska and non-Alaska jurisprudence that 
predates the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Winkelman v. 
Parma City School District. The Author then examines the Winkelman 
decision itself, as well as the impact of Winkelman on IDEA-related pro se 
litigation. The Author notes the difficulties that parents continue to face in 
IDEA-related litigation and concludes by proposing reforms designed to aid 
parents in protecting the interests of children with disabilities. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................272 
I.   THE IDEA ............................................................................................273 
II.   RULES REGARDING PRO SE PLAINTIFFS IN ALASKA ...........................275 
III.   ALASKA’S PRE-WINKELMAN CASES.....................................................277 
IV.   NON-ALASKA PRE-WINKELMAN CASES..............................................279 
 
Copyright © 2009 by Sonja Kerr. 
 * Sonja D. Kerr is a Senior Attorney with the Public Interest Law Center of 
Philadelphia. Ms. Kerr has represented children with disabilities in special 
education hearings since the late 1980s. Prior to joining the Law Center in March 
2009, Ms. Kerr practiced for five years in Alaska, in both private practice and 
with firms, with her work resulting in many of the initial decisions on special 
education matters in Alaska. Ms. Kerr opened and operated the first special 
education law firm in Minnesota, representing children in that state and 
throughout the Midwest for fifteen years. Ms. Kerr holds a law degree from 
Indiana University and a Master’s Degree in Psychology from Purdue 
University. She was the first chairperson of the Council of Parent Attorneys and 
Advocates and remains on the Council’s board. Ms. Kerr is currently licensed in 
Alaska, Pennsylvania, and Indiana, and is admitted to the United States 
Supreme Court, the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, and various federal and 
state courts. 
KERR_FMT3.DOC 12/3/2009  11:53:35 AM 
272 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:2 
V.   THE WINKELMAN DECISION ................................................................281 
VI.   THE IMPACT OF WINKELMAN...............................................................283 
VII.   THE FUTURE OF IDEA LITIGATION .....................................................285 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................287 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Alaska has a long and proud history of pro se litigation.1 
Nevertheless, parents of children with disabilities have faced difficulties 
when attempting to represent themselves and their children in court 
proceedings seeking to protect the educational opportunities to which 
the children are entitled under the federal Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA).2 In May 2007, the United States Supreme Court 
held, in Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School District,3 that 
parents of children with disabilities have the right to represent 
themselves in special education proceedings in federal courts.4 The 
Court, however, reserved the question of whether parents could 
represent their children in the same proceedings, focusing instead on the 
parents’ right to proceed pro se to protect their own rights arising under 
federal law.5 This Article examines the impact of Winkelman in Alaska, 
where, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, at least two unrepresented 
parents were prohibited from representing their children in the federal 
courts.6 The Article also examines the policy implications of permitting 
parents, some of whom may be disabled, to attempt to navigate through 
the muddy waters of state and federal courts without counsel. The 
Author hopes that this Article will foster a close examination of the 
Winkelman issue in Alaska and other states, especially given the dearth 
of special education attorneys throughout the United States.7 
 
 1. See, e.g., Breck v. Almer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987). 
 2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006). 
 3. 550 U.S. 516 (2007). 
 4. Id. at 535. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. W.O. ex rel. C.O., No. 3:06-cv-00233-TMB, slip 
op. at 3 (D. Alaska Apr. 10, 2007); Hansen v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., No. A06-
00069 CV (TMB), slip op. at 3 (D. Alaska Apr. 19, 2006). 
 7. The United States Department of Education, Office of Special Education, 
states that the IDEA serves approximately 6,800,000 children and youth with 
disabilities. See United States Department of Education, Office of Special 
Education, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/osep/index.html (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2009). There are two common resources for parents to find special 
education attorneys to assist them. The website of the Council of Parent 
Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) lists attorneys. COPAA estimates that it has 
486 active attorney members with a total of 1,113 combined active and lapsed 
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I.  THE IDEA 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is a federal law that 
funds state educational services for disabled children.8 States that accept 
IDEA funding are obligated to identify students with disabilities and 
ensure that each eligible student receives a “free appropriate public 
education” (FAPE).9 The primary vehicle for delivering a FAPE is the 
Individualized Education Program (IEP).10 An IEP is a document that 
describes the student’s learning goals, as well as the services, strategies, 
modifications, and accommodations that will be used to reach those 
goals.11 Under the IDEA, school districts must develop and implement 
IEPs meeting the unique educational needs of each eligible student.12  
The IDEA strictly mandates parental involvement throughout the 
development and implementation of a student’s IEP.13 This mandate is, 
in large part, a result of the IDEA’s history. The IDEA was born as a 
result of parental advocacy, particularly by those parents who, long 
before most states allowed it, demanded that children with disabilities 
be educated by public schools.14 
Parents are critical members of the “IEP Team,” and the IDEA 
intends that parents and schools work together to ensure the adequacy 
of student services. Parents must, for example, be given written notice of 
any changes a school district proposes for their child’s education 
program.15 When the parents and the school cannot agree on an IEP’s 
terms, the parents have a specific right to appeal the school’s proposed 
program through an administrative hearing, often referred to as a “due 
process” hearing.16 Dissatisfied parents can request an impartial due 
process hearing to contest specific elements of an IEP, the denial of 
requested services, or any other objectionable aspects of a proposed 
 
attorney members. Email from Denise Marshall, Executive Director of COPAA, 
to Sonja Kerr (Sept. 21, 2009) (on file with author). Each state does have a 
federally mandated disability protection and advocacy office. See National 
Disability Rights Network, http://www.napas.org. Only some of the offices 
provide special education representation. 
 8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006). 
 9. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006). 
 10. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191–93 (1982); Mills v. Bd. 
of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. 
Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279, 281–82 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded 
Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
 15. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2006). 
 16. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2006). 
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plan.17 A hearing examiner is empowered to determine whether a 
proposed IEP satisfies the requirements of a FAPE, whether the changes 
requested by the parents will be granted, and whether specific relief, 
such as ordering private school placement, is appropriate.18 
As the Alaska Supreme Court has pointed out, due process 
hearings are “formal adjudicatory proceedings in which parents and 
children have the rights to counsel, to present evidence, and to call, 
confront, and compel the attendance of witnesses.”19 Due process 
hearings are required to be expedited: once a parent asks for a hearing, a 
hearing officer has forty-five days in which to issue a final, written 
decision.20 Parents also have several other rights: the right to bring a 
child to proceedings concerning the child; the right to an open, public 
hearing; and the right to free copies of the decision and record.21 
Notably, parents typically bear the burden of proof in the administrative 
process, unless a school district, in the unusual instance, brings the 
hearing.22 Additionally, the expenses of experts called by the parents are 
not recoverable as a litigation cost.23 
In short, these “due process hearings” are essentially full-blown 
trials. By long-standing practice, parents can represent themselves in the 
due process stage in every state and are permitted to be accompanied by 
a lawyer or persons with special knowledge or training regarding 
children with disabilities, known as “lay advocates.”24 These lay 
 
 17. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (2006). 
 18. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E) (2006). 
 19. Bickford v. State, 155 P.3d 302, 304 (Alaska 2007). 
 20. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4)(B) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (2007). But see 
Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. D.K., 3:08-cv-00031 TMB, slip op. at 11 (D. Alaska Sept. 
30, 2009) (holding that exceeding the forty-five day rule did not deprive the 
hearing officer of jurisdiction). 
 21. 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(c) (2007). 
 22. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550(i)(11) (2009). Some states do place 
the burden of proof on the school district. Following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Schaeffer v. Murphy, 546 U.S. 49 (2005), some states changed the 
burden of proof, placing it on parents; Alaska was one of those states. 
 23. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300 
(2006). 
 24. 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (2007). Alaska has had no ruling on the use of lay 
advocates as representatives at due process hearings, and there is no specific 
Alaskan statute or rule on the subject. New Jersey Administrative Code 1:6A-4.2 
permits lay advocates to represent parents in due process hearings. States, 
however, have held that lay advocates may risk charges of unauthorized 
practice of law if they charge parents for their work in due process hearings. See 
Arons v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 842 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding that 
charging parents for services constitutes unauthorized practice of law). In some 
states, the state provision permits representation without payment. In re Arons, 
756 A.2d 867 (Del. 2000) (finding that Arons, a lay advocate, had engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law). 
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advocates, however, must be very careful to avoid the unauthorized 
practice of law, as courts have previously held in some instances that 
parents seeking to use lay advocates were unable to represent 
themselves.25 
Once administrative processes have been exhausted, a parent who 
remains dissatisfied has the right to file an appeal in federal district 
court or state court. 26 In Alaska state court, a party may have as little as 
thirty days to file an appeal.27 The decisions of the trial court may be 
appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, depending upon whether the IDEA claim was brought in state 
or federal court. 
II.  RULES REGARDING PRO SE PLAINTIFFS IN ALASKA 
Parents of students with disabilities, including those who have 
represented themselves and their children in administrative forums, 
may encounter barriers to representation at the appellate stage. In light 
of these barriers, parents in Alaska should carefully consider which 
court system they should utilize. 
In Alaska state court, plaintiffs who file without legal 
representation may be able to benefit from rules that are somewhat more 
relaxed than the rules governing parties with attorneys. The Alaska 
Supreme Court held, in Breck v. Almer,28 that “[t]he pleadings of pro se 
litigants should be held to less stringent standards than those of 
lawyers.”29 The court elaborated that judges have a duty to inform a pro 
se plaintiff of the “proper procedure for the action he or she is obviously 
attempting to accomplish.”30 This holding has developed into a rule that 
bars Alaska state court judges from dismissing unrepresented plaintiffs’ 
cases on technicalities.31 Instead, judges must ensure that unrepresented 
 
 25.  Delaware’s highest court, for example, held that a parent who sought to 
use a lay advocate was unable to represent herself. In re Machette, No. 239, 2004 
WL 1535729, at *2 (Del. June 17, 2004). 
 26. 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(a) (2007). 
 27. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.193(a) (2008); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.560(a) (2008). 
The IDEA provides for ninety days to appeal, unless state law contains an 
explicit time limitation. 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(b) (2007). It is not clear if Alaska has 
an explicit time limitation, but if it does, the limit is thirty days from the date of 
decision. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.193(a) (2008); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.560(a) 
(2008). 
 28. 745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987). 
 29. Id. at 75. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Gilbert v. Nina Plaza Condo Ass’n, 64 P.3d 126, 129 (Alaska 2003) (“It 
is well settled that in cases involving a pro se litigant the superior court must 
relax procedural requirements to a reasonable extent.”). 
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plaintiffs are aware of the rules they need to follow and the procedures 
that are available to them. Under this holding, the Alaska Supreme 
Court has identified a variety of specific rules and procedures about 
which judges must inform pro se plaintiffs. For example, a judge must 
inform a plaintiff of his or her rights to file a reply to a defendant’s 
answer and to defeat a defendant’s summary judgment motion by filing 
opposing affidavits.32 Additionally, pro se plaintiffs should be informed 
of the correct method for withdrawing admissions so that they do not 
lose on summary judgment based on those admissions.33 Judges should 
also inform unrepresented plaintiffs of deficiencies in their appellate 
paperwork and provide them with opportunities to rectify the 
problems.34 Further, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that 
adjudicative officers of administrative agencies generally have the same 
duties to pro se plaintiffs as state court judges.35 In spite of these and 
other rulings, a judge’s obligations to a pro se plaintiff are case-specific.36 
While the line of cases flowing from Breck does demonstrate that 
pro se plaintiffs are afforded a degree of leniency in Alaska state courts, 
this leniency is not without limits. In Bauman v. Division of Family and 
Youth Services,37 the Alaska Supreme Court explained that while Breck 
applied to unrepresented plaintiffs with defective motions, it did not 
extend to unrepresented plaintiffs who failed to submit any motions.38 
The court observed that the complicated nature of lawsuits is common 
knowledge and that pro se plaintiffs must demonstrate some effort to 
comply with procedural rules.39 Those rules were adopted to provide 
fair and reasonable notice to all parties, and requiring judges to instruct 
pro se plaintiffs at every step of the litigation could compromise their 
neutrality.40 Alaska courts tend to balance the competing concerns of 
Breck and Bauman when deciding whether a judge’s treatment of a pro se 
plaintiff has been appropriate.41 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage, 76 P.3d 844, 846–47 (Alaska 2003). 
 34. Dougan v. Aurora Elec. Inc., 50 P.3d 789, 795 (Alaska 2002). 
 35. Bohlmann v. Alaska Constr. & Eng’g, 205 P.3d 316, 320 (Alaska 2009). 
 36. See, e.g., Adkins v. Stansel, 204 P.3d 1031, 1033 (Alaska 2009) (stating that 
judges should consider discernable pro se arguments if they are based on 
established law and if consideration will not prejudice the opposing party); 
Hymes v. Deramus, 119 P.3d 963, 966 (Alaska 2005) (trial judge has a duty to 
inform pro se litigant of proper procedure for whatever the litigant is trying to 
accomplish). 
 37. 768 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1989). 
 38. Id. at 1099. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Snyder v. Am. Legion Spenard Post No. 28, 119 P.3d 996, 999–
1000 (Alaska 2005); Collins v. Arctic Builders, 957 P.2d 980, 982 (Alaska 1998). 
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Alaska courts have self-help assistance in other areas. Although 
there is no direct self-help center for parents of children with disabilities, 
there are general family law resources. For example, the Alaska 
Supreme Court has a “Family Law Self-Help Center” that provides 
explanations, forms, and classes on representing both oneself and one’s 
children in family court proceedings.42 The website includes the Self-
Help Center’s toll-free number, which pro se litigants may call for 
advice on procedures.43 It also includes explanations and examples of 
general motion practice,44 trial preparation,45 and finishing a trial.46 This 
material can provide background information for a pro se parent 
attempting to appeal a special education matter. The Alaska courts also 
have a general website on pro se representation in appeals of civil 
matters.47 The website includes explanations of timelines, procedures, 
and assistance available to those seeking to file or defend an appeal.48 
In contrast, the federal district court in Alaska has generally been 
less responsive to pro se litigants. The court does have an assistance 
manual, “Representing Yourself in Alaska’s Federal Court,”49 though 
individuals reading the manual are cautioned that the court staff cannot 
assist any litigant and that the “same rules of practice and procedure” 
apply as if the readers were represented by attorneys.50 
III.  ALASKA’S PRE-WINKELMAN CASES 
Prior to the Winkelman decision, parents in Alaska attempted to 
represent their children’s interests in both administrative and court 
proceedings, and at least one parent previously litigated matters up to 
 
 42. Alaska Court System, Family Law Self-Help Center, http://www.state. 
ak.us/courts/selfhelp.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Alaska Court System, Motion Practice—Requesting an Order From the 
Court, http://courts.alaska.gov/motions.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
 45. Alaska Court System, Hearing and Trial Preparation, http:// 
courts.alaska.gov/shctrial.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
 46. Alaska Court System, Finishing the Case: Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree and Judgment, http://courts.alaska.gov/ 
shcfinish.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
 47. Alaska Court System, Self-Help Services: Appeals, http://www.courts. 
alaska.gov/shc/appeals/appeals.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
 48. Alaska Court System, Self-Help Services: Appeals—Forms and 
Instructions for Civil Appeals, http://courts.alaska.gov/shc/appeals/ 
appealsins.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
 49. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF ALASKA, REPRESENTING YOURSELF IN 
ALASKA’S FEDERAL COURT (THE PRO SE HANDBOOK) (2002), available at 
http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/reference/pro_se/Pro_Se_Handbook.pdf. 
 50. Id. at 3. 
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the Alaska Supreme Court.51 It does not appear that the Department of 
Education or the Commissioner of Education in that case challenged her 
right to litigate on behalf of her child. However, in two cases in federal 
district court, the Anchorage School District did challenge the right of 
the parents to proceed on behalf of their children, and the school district 
was successful in both instances. 
In Anchorage School District v. W.O ex rel. C.O.,52 a disabled student, 
proceeding through his mother, prevailed at the administrative hearing 
stage of the IEP process.53 The school district appealed the outcome in 
federal court, naming the student as the defendant.54 The judge held that 
the mother was not permitted to represent her son in the matter because 
she was not an attorney.55 Recognizing that the mother had a potentially 
meritorious claim but could not afford to pay an attorney, the judge 
granted her motion for the appointment of volunteer counsel.56 
However, the judge cautioned that granting the motion did not 
guarantee that volunteer counsel would be found.57 He acknowledged 
that in such a case, both the parents and the district would be in a catch-
22.58 The district had a right to appeal, yet it could not sue an 
unrepresented minor.59 The child had a right to defend the outcome of 
the hearings, but he could not lawfully do so without a lawyer.60 
Ultimately, the issue in the case evaporated when the parents were 
assisted by Alaska Legal Services Corporation.61 However, the W.O. 
ruling sends a signal to parents: if they are successful in the 
administrative forum, but unable to afford appellate counsel, they may 
be able to avoid additional litigation because the school district will be 
without recourse to proceed. 
A similar case, Hansen v. Anchorage School District,62 involved a 
father attempting to represent his disabled son in a civil complaint filed 
in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.63 The 
 
 51. Bickford v. State, 155 P.3d 302, 303 (Alaska 2007). 
 52. No. 3:06-cv-00233-TMB, slip op. at 1 (D. Alaska Dec. 13, 2006). 
 53. Id. at *2. 
 54. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. W.O. ex rel. C.O., No. 3:06-cv-00233-TMB, slip op. 
at 1 (D. Alaska Apr. 10, 2007). 
 55. Id. at 3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 3 n.10. 
 58. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. W.O. ex rel. C.O., No. 3:06-cv-00233-TMB, slip op. 
at 3 (D. Alaska Dec. 13, 2006). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1. 
 61. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. W.O. ex rel. C.O., No. 3:06-cv-00233-TMB, Doc. 8, 
Notice of Entry of Appearance (D. Alaska Apr. 24, 2007). 
 62. No. A06-00069 CV (TMB), slip op. at 1 (D. Alaska Apr. 19, 2006). 
 63. Id. 
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complaint stated that he wished to “appeal a special education 
matter.”64 The father also requested a waiver of the filing fee.65 In an 
order denying these requests, the judge stated that unless the father was 
himself an attorney, he could not represent his son in court.66 This was 
because a litigant may act as his own counsel but may not represent 
another individual.67 The judge recommended that the father contact the 
Alaska Bar Association’s Lawyer Referral Service for assistance in 
securing counsel.68 In order to avoid dismissal, the father would have to 
file an amended complaint through an attorney and pay the filing fee.69 
The case was later dismissed when the father failed to do so by the given 
deadline.70 
IV.  NON-ALASKA PRE-WINKELMAN CASES 
Prior to Winkelman, a body of case law had developed in courts 
outside of Alaska. In these cases, both district and circuit courts were 
deciding whether parents who had exhausted available administrative 
remedies were barred from proceeding on behalf of their children in 
federal court. 
In Cavanaugh ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School District,71 the 
parents of a disabled child proceeded without counsel in federal court 
after exhausting all administrative remedies available to contest the IEP 
that the school district had proposed for their son.72 The parents argued 
that the IDEA abrogated the common law prohibition on non-lawyer 
parents representing their children.73 The court disagreed on the 
grounds that any statute, including the IDEA, must explicitly overturn 
background legal principles; it cannot do so by implication, as the 
parents had argued.74 The Cavanaugh court also rejected the notion that 
parents had their own enforceable rights under the IDEA.75 It held that 
substantive rights under the IDEA belong solely to students, and that 
parents have only a narrow band of procedural rights.76 Thus, the 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 3. 
 67. Id. at 2. 
 68. Id. at 3. 
 69. Id. at 4. 
 70. Hansen v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., No. 3:06-cv-00069-TMB, slip op. at 2 (D. 
Alaska May 24, 2006). 
 71. 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 72. Id. at 755. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 756. 
 75. Id. at 757. 
 76. Id. 
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parents were required to furnish counsel for their child to avoid 
dismissal of the claim.77 
The Eleventh Circuit previously reached the same result in Devine 
v. Indian River County School Board.78 In that case, the district court 
denied a father’s motion to remove counsel and personally represent his 
son in a lawsuit over a school’s proposed IEP.79 The circuit court 
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that parents do not have a 
right to represent their children in IDEA-related claims.80 It 
acknowledged that the statute explicitly permits parents to do so during 
administrative appeals, but it found no evidence that Congress intended 
to extend that right to proceedings in district court.81 
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar legal conclusion in Mosely v. 
Board of Education,82 though the ultimate outcome of the proceedings was 
notably different. In Mosely, a mother, acting without legal 
representation, sued in federal court to challenge the treatment of her 
disabled son.83 The district court judge dismissed the case for failure to 
exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies.84 On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit addressed the mother’s ability to represent her son in an IDEA 
action in federal court.85 The court stated that “[t]he short answer . . . is 
that she cannot [represent her son], unless she hires counsel.”86 
However, the court recognized that parents’ rights under the IDEA give 
them certain procedural interests.87 Based on these interests and the 
specific factual allegations in the case, the court held that the mother 
was suing for her own injuries.88 The court remanded the case and 
explicitly authorized the mother to proceed pro se, though only on her 
own behalf.89 
However, the First Circuit interpreted matters differently, finding 
that parents could proceed on behalf of their children. In Maroni ex rel. 
Michael M. v. Pemi-Baker Regional School District,90 the parents of a 
disabled student were dissatisfied with the IEP proposed by the child’s 
 
 77. Id. at 757–58. 
 78. 121 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 79. Id. at 577–78. 
 80. Id. at 581. 
 81. Id. at 582. 
 82. 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 83. Id. at 529. 
 84. Id. at 531. 
 85. Id. at 532. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 529. 
 89. Id. at 535. 
 90. 346 F.3d 247 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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school.91 After exhausting administrative remedies, the parents filed suit 
in federal district court.92 The parents’ income exceeded the limits for 
free legal assistance, and they stated that they could neither afford an 
attorney nor find one who would take the case on a contingency basis.93 
The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire 
dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the plaintiffs could not proceed on 
their child’s behalf.94 The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that parents are “aggrieved parties” under the IDEA regardless 
of whether the underlying claim is procedural or substantive.95 Based 
largely on the text of the IDEA, the court held that Congress intended 
for parents to be able to vindicate their children’s rights under the Act.96 
Requiring parents to secure counsel when they are unable to do so 
would be inconsistent with this intent.97 
V.  THE WINKELMAN DECISION 
The Winkelmans were the parents of a child diagnosed with an 
autism spectrum disorder, a condition which qualified him for services 
under the IDEA.98 The Winkelmans actively participated in the IEP 
process, but they felt that the final IEP proposed by the school district 
was inadequate for their son’s educational needs.99 At the parents’ 
request, impartial due process hearings were held—first before a 
hearing officer, and then before a state-level review officer.100 Both 
officers upheld the district’s proposed IEP as providing an adequate 
FAPE for the Winkelmans’ son.101 
As permitted by the IDEA, the Winkelmans filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio after 
exhausting their administrative remedies.102 The complaint alleged that 
the proposed IEP illegally denied a suitable FAPE.103 The Winkelmans 
were not represented by counsel in their suit.104 The district court 
granted summary judgment to the school district on the merits; the 
 
 91. Id. at 248. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 250–51. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 257–58. 
 98. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 519 (2007). 
 99. Id. at 519–20. 
 100. Id. at 520. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 520–21. 
 103. Id. at 521. 
 104. Id. 
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parents, again proceeding on behalf of their son, appealed to the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.105 Without reaching the merits of the case, the 
Sixth Circuit entered an order to dismiss the claim unless the 
Winkelmans secured counsel for their son.106 The court reasoned that 
since the right to a FAPE belonged to the student and not to his parents, 
the parents were not actually parties to the case, but had instead brought 
the claim on behalf of their son.107 By a longstanding common law rule, 
non-lawyer parents were prohibited from representing minor children, 
so the parents could not proceed per se.108 
The Sixth Circuit’s order was appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on the narrow issue of whether 
parents may proceed pro se on IDEA claims in federal court.109 The 
Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that parents are 
“entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.”110 The Court 
concluded that the IDEA bestows enforceable rights on parents, 
independent of the rights bestowed on disabled students.111 It pointed 
out that a comprehensive reading of the IDEA reveals that parental 
rights are embedded throughout the IEP process, both as a safeguard for 
students’ rights and in recognition of parents’ fundamental interests in 
their children’s educations.112 Among the rights afforded to parents are 
automatic membership on the IEP team, administrative remedies when 
they disagree with the outcome of the IEP process, and the right to 
reimbursement for various expenses.113 Although some circuits have 
held that parents have only procedural rights and thus cannot proceed 
pro se on substantive claims, the Supreme Court found that this position 
led to incongruous results.114 It would permit some parents to vindicate 
their children’s rights in federal court, while others would be required to 
retain counsel.115 
It should be noted that the Court did not overturn the common law 
principle that non-lawyer parents may not represent minor children, 
even in the context of IDEA cases. While this issue was raised in 
Winkelman, the Court did not reach it.116 Instead, it found that non-
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 522. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 535. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 528–31. 
 113. Id. at 530–31. 
 114. Id. at 531. 
 115. See id. at 532–33. 
 116. Id. at 535. 
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lawyer parents have their own claims under the IDEA and may bring 
those claims pro se.117 The result is that parents’ personal claims relating 
to their children’s eligibility for services under the IDEA will not be 
dismissed because the children are not represented by counsel. The 
IDEA bestows independent rights upon parents of disabled children, 
allowing the parents to bring claims on a pro se basis.118 
In Winkelman, the Supreme Court recognized that parental 
involvement is a strong principle underlying the IDEA, as Congress 
believed that parental involvement would enhance educational 
prospects for disabled children.119 The IDEA is more effective if parents 
have a meaningful opportunity to advocate for their children at every 
stage of the process, including through pro se complaints in federal 
court.120 However, while hailed as a victory for parents to proceed pro 
se, it is not entirely clear whether the Court has limited that 
representation to the parents or whether the parent is also permitted to 
represent the child. The Court concluded that because the IDEA does 
not differentiate between the rights accorded to children and those 
accorded to parents, a parent may be an aggrieved party for purposes of 
the IDEA with regard to any matter implicating those rights.121 At the 
same time, it appears that the Court may have restricted parents’ rights 
to advocating solely on their own behalf, and not on behalf of their 
children. 
VI.  THE IMPACT OF WINKELMAN 
Because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Winkelman, parents of 
children with disabilities can now represent themselves in federal and 
state courts. This result is coherent and consistent with the significant 
role that the IDEA has always afforded to parents of children with 
disabilities. The first case examining the IDEA, Board of Education v. 
Rowley,122 explained that: “[a]s this very case demonstrates, parents and 
guardians will not lack ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped 
children receive all of the benefits to which they are entitled by the 
Act.”123 While the courts have continued to weigh in on the 
interpretation of Winkelman, parents have maintained their fight to 
represent not only themselves, but also their children. 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 531. 
 122. 458 U.S. 178 (1978). 
 123. Id. at 209. 
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has twice ruled on the issue of 
parental representation after Winkelman. In Muse B. ex rel. Hanna B. v. 
Upper Darby School District,124 the court interpreted Winkelman as 
allowing parents to represent themselves pro se because under the 
IDEA, parents’ substantive rights are not limited to procedural and 
reimbursement-related matters.125 The Third Circuit reasoned that 
parents have the right to prosecute actions on their own behalf, and thus 
an appeal filed by parents in an IDEA case should not be dismissed for 
lack of counsel.126 According to the Third Circuit, “the Supreme Court 
reasoned that the IDEA requires school districts to develop an IEP for 
each child with a disability, with parents playing a significant role in this 
process.”127 Further, since “parents enjoy enforceable rights at the 
administrative stage . . . it would be inconsistent with the statutory 
scheme to bar them from continuing to assert those rights in federal 
court.”128 The Third Circuit went on to state that the Supreme Court has 
expressly reserved the question of whether the IDEA entitles parents to 
litigate their children’s claims without the assistance of counsel.129 
Accordingly, it held that, under Winkelman, parents may litigate pro se 
in federal court with regard to their IDEA rights to challenge the 
substantive adequacy of their children’s FAPEs.130 
In Woodruff v. Hamilton Township Public Schools,131 the Third Circuit 
further clarified that parents cannot represent their children in every 
issue being litigated, even if one of the claims is under the IDEA.132 The 
parents in Woodruff filed pro se claims in federal district court on behalf 
of themselves and their child.133 The Woodruffs brought claims for 
violations of the IDEA, as well as various state law, due process, and 
common law claims.134 The district court concluded that Winkelman does 
not grant parents the right to litigate non-IDEA claims on their 
children’s behalf.135 After the Woodruffs filed an amended complaint 
purportedly containing only their own claims, the district court 
dismissed the alleged injuries as insufficiently personal.136 On appeal, 
 
 124. 282 Fed. App’x 986 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 125. Id. at 990. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (citing Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 524 (2007)). 
 128. Id. (quoting Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 526) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. 305 Fed. App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 132. Id. at 836. 
 133. Id. at 835. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 835–36. 
 136. Id. at 836. 
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the Third Circuit affirmed the district court, concluding that “Winkelman 
does not translate into a broad right to pursue any statutory or common 
law claims on a child’s behalf. With the exception of an IDEA action on 
their own behalf, the Woodruffs may not represent [their child] in the 
federal courts in this circuit.”137 
Similarly, in J.R. v. Sylvan Union School District,138 the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of California concluded that 
Winkelman limits parents’ pro se representation to representing only 
themselves.139 The court drew a careful distinction, noting that 
Winkelman enables plaintiff parents “to pursue their IDEA claims 
without counsel,” but does not recognize a right to pursue non-IDEA 
claims on behalf of their children.140 The court cited the general rule that 
“a parent or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child 
without retaining a lawyer.”141 According to J.R., only where the rights 
of the child and parents are coterminous can the parents pursue, on their 
own behalf, the claims they share with their child.142 
Parents of children with disabilities clearly have the “right” to 
represent themselves pro se in the courts. Yet, it appears unlikely at this 
juncture that courts will allow them to represent their children in 
matters relating to the children’s substantive rights. As a policy matter, 
without the right to represent their children in regard to substantive 
rights, parents may not have the ability or resources to protect those 
rights. As a result, the children’s underlying claims may be permanently 
lost. 
VII.  THE FUTURE OF IDEA LITIGATION 
Federal and state courts can be a labyrinth of confusing procedures 
and practices. Even experienced attorneys can make errors that have 
critical implications for cases. How, then, are parents supposed to 
navigate these systems? Parents are unlikely to simply retreat or give up 
on advocating for their children, and they will continue to make efforts 
to represent themselves and their children in seeking to obtain the 
 
 137. Id. (citing Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 
876, 882 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 138. No. CIV S-06-2136 LKK GGH PS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18168 (E.D. Cal. 
Mar. 10, 2008). 
 139. Id. at *4. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. (quoting Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 
1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Johns, the Ninth Circuit wrote that 
where minors “have claims that require adjudication, they are entitled to trained 
legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected. ” Johns, 114 F.3d at 877. 
 142. J.R., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18168, at *4. 
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education to which their children are lawfully entitled. As explained by 
the Department of Justice’s amicus brief in the Winkelman case, the rights 
of parents and the rights of children under the IDEA are intermixed and 
interrelated; separation of these rights is difficult due to the interlocking 
nature of the rights conferred by the IDEA.143 Courts in each state need 
to reexamine their own procedures and the processes in light of 
Winkelman. 
We know that many states, including Alaska, have developed “self-
help” programs and assistance in other types of law (for example, family 
law). Alaska has a well-developed “self-help” program that guides 
individuals through divorce and custody processes. The same type of 
assistance should be made available to parents who wish to represent 
themselves and their children with disabilities, whether in special 
education hearings, federal court, or state court. Without such a process, 
parents will likely stumble and their children’s rights will be left 
unprotected. 
Alaska has approximately 19,000 of this country’s 6,800,000 
children with disabilities.144 There are simply not enough lawyers to 
assist even the small percentage of parents who need representation in 
order to fully protect their own rights and their children’s rights under 
the Winkelman standard. This problem is not unique to Alaska, but is 
evident throughout the United States, where fewer than five hundred 
lawyers practice exclusively in the area of special education law.145 
 
 143. See, e.g., Brief of the Equal Justice Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 
550 U.S. 516 (2006), 2006 WL 3735956; Brief of Council of Parent Attorneys and 
Advocates Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Winkelman ex rel. 
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2006), 2006 WL 3740368; Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Supporting Petitioners, Winkelman ex 
rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2006), 2006 WL 3740370 at 
*6–7, nn.2–3. 
 144. DEP’T OF EDUC. AND EARLY DEV., STATE OF ALASKA, REPORT CARD TO THE 
PUBLIC 2 (2008), available at http://www.eed.state.ak.us/reportcard/2007-
2008/reportcard2007-08.pdf. This report reflects an average daily membership of 
128,975 students with 14.8% in special education, which is approximately 19,088. 
Id. 
 145. The Author was the only full-time private attorney specializing in special 
education in Alaska. According to the listings on the website of the Council of 
Parent Attorneys and Advocates, http://www.copaa.net, this is not a unique 
phenomenon. COPAA’s membership is about 1200, including approximately 500 
attorneys, with the remainder being parents and lay advocates. Each state does 
have a federally mandated disability protection and advocacy office. National 
Disability Rights Network, History, http://www.napas.org/aboutus/history. 
htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). However, only some of these offices provide 
special education services. 
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With the Winkelman decision, it is critical that states, including 
Alaska, develop ways to help parents navigate administrative and court 
systems. Each state is responsible for creating ways to train parents and 
provide them with information about their rights and how to protect 
those rights. Yet only a few states have begun the process of developing 
manuals or training materials for parents who want to represent 
themselves. Pennsylvania, for example, is in the process of developing a 
special education hearing manual for parents who wish to represent 
themselves, but even this manual is primarily limited to the proceedings 
on the administrative level.146 
The IDEA’s administrative proceedings, as well as the court 
appeals based on those proceedings, were originally designed to be 
parent-friendly. They were also designed to allow parents to speak on 
behalf of themselves and their children. However, the appeals from 
those proceedings have become procedurally and substantively 
complicated. Courts, legislatures, the Federal Office of Special Education 
Programs, and the United States Congress should examine this problem 
by convening a national taskforce on the issue. The taskforce would 
examine: (1) the resources parents need to represent themselves and 
their children adequately in due process hearings and in the courts; (2) 
the availability of a process whereby, similar to juvenile court, children 
with disabilities will have “educational” public defenders to fight for 
their rights free of charge; and (3) the repercussions if children with 
disabilities are left without recourse if their parents cannot afford an 
attorney, as well as how a child’s claims will be lost at the appellate 
stage if parents cannot afford counsel and the child’s claims are found to 
be separate from, and not coterminous with, the parents’ claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Winkelman, states may see 
an increase in pro se representation by parents, both in federal court and 
in due process hearings. Yet, those same parents may not be able to 
represent their own children in federal district court if an appeal is taken 
by either side, leaving the child without recourse and both parties 
without a fair resolution. 
The purpose of the IDEA will be best served if this problem is 
addressed directly as a policy matter, rather than leaving parents of 
 
 146. OFFICE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PENNSYLVANIA SPECIAL EDUCATION 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MANUAL (2009), available at http://odr.pattan.net/files/ 
ODR/SEDR_Man.pdf; cf. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE W. DIST. OF PA., PRO SE 
PACKAGE: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO FILING A CIVIL ACTION (2006), available at 
http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Forms/PROSEman.pdf. 
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these 6,800,000 children with disabilities to scramble and scratch their 
way through the labyrinth of various legal systems. No one wins if one 
party is not adequately represented, particularly where the educational 
needs of a child are at stake. A national taskforce must be convened to 
examine the problem caused by the lack of representation for the very 
children that the IDEA is designed to serve. If a child’s parents cannot 
represent them, parents and schools need to know who will. The 
taskforce must ultimately decide whether to amend the statute to permit 
parents to represent their children as well as themselves, or to provide 
specific funding to ensure that parents and children are sufficiently 
represented by lawyers or lay advocates at all levels of litigation. 
